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Unemployment vs. Employment
Duringthe last recession, the U.S. experienced the
highest unemployment rates since the great de-
pression ofthe 1930s. Duringthis same recession,
however, the lowestemployment rate was ap-
proximatelythesame as thatprevailingduringthe
boom years ofthe late 1960s when unemploy-
mentwas very low. Although the employmentrate
(the percentoftheaduItpopulation employed) did
decline during the 1981-82 recession, it fell only
2 percentage points. This decline contrasted mar-
kedly with the 3.6 percentage point rise in the
unemploymentrate. Howcan one reconciIe these
apparently divergent statistics? Does the unem-
ploymentrate ortheemploymentrate giveabetter
picture of labor market conditions?
In this Letter, I show that variations in rates at
which persons enter and leave the labor force
over the business cycle strongly affect the un-
employment rate. Consequently, the interpreta-
tion ofthe unemployment rate is notentirely
straightforward, and, for some purposes at least,
theemployment rate is asuperior measure oflabor
market conditions.
Measuring unemployment
The unemploymentrate (as defined bythe Depart-
mentof Labor) is simply the ratio ofthe numberof
persons unemployed (persons actively looking for
work plus persons on temporary layoff) to the
labor force (persons employed plus persons un-
employed). The unemploymentand employment
rates are measures ofthe probabilities ofbeing
unemployed and employed, respectively. How-
ever, the unemployment rate is a measure ofthe
probability ofbeing unemployed at a moment in
time conditional on being a labor force partici-
pant. In contrast, the employment rate is simply
the unconditional probability ofbeing employed.
Iflaborforce participants were afixed groupofthe
population who either worked or were unem-
ployed, then the unemployment rate would have
a straightforward interpretation. High unemploy-
ment would mean a smaller probability ofbeing
employed for a member ofthe group. Further-
more, ifthe laborforce group were a constant
fraction ofthe population, employmentand un-
employment rates wouId be mirrorimages ofeach
other-high unemploymentwould imply a low
likelihood ofemployment and vice versa. How-
ever, neitherthe laborforcenortheunemployed is
a fixed segment ofthe population. In some
months, for instance, considerable numbers of
persons previously not in the labor force enter to
search for employment, increasing the numberof
unemployed persons and the unemploymentrate.
This changing composition ofthe labor force
means that high unemployment does not neces-
sarily imply low employment.
Business cycles and the labor force
Economists have long recognized that flows into
and outofthe labor force mightvary over the
business cycle and thus affectunemployment. Two
theories ofthe cYci ical behavior of laborforce
entry and exit-the added-worker and discour-
aged-worker hypotheses-have played a promi-
nent role in the economics literature.
The added-worker hypothesis postu lates that as
labor market conditions deteriorate during a re-
cession, secondary workers, with weak attach-
mentto the labor force, wouId enter. This might
happen because the unemploymentofthe pri-
mary earner would lead secondary earners to
search for employment and thus add to the ranks
ofthe unemployed. Such an influx of job seekers
wouId cause aggregate unemploymentto increase
during a recession by a larger amountthan the
increase due solely to the deterioratingemploy-
mentprospects ofthose already in the Iaborforce.
Ifsuch an influx did occur, the corresponding
increase in the unemployment rate would over-
state the decline in demand for labor because
each job loss would result in more than one per-
son being reported as unemployed.
Alternatively, the discouraged-worker hypothesis
positsthatthe rise in unemploymentduring reces-
sions is understated. According to this view, the
increased costs offinding a suitablejob would
lead to a reduction in job search and hence a
reduction in the number of persons counted as
unemployed. In otherwords, as labormarketcon-
ditions deteriorate during a recession, more and
more searchers would become discouraged by
poor labor market conditions and leave the laborFRBSF
force, and fewer person, not in the labor force
would enter to search for employment. Ifthe re-
ductions in job-search activity were sufficiently
large, the unemployment rate might noteven rise
as labor market conditions deteriorated.
Determining which ofthese effects dominates
with aggregate data on the cyclical variation in the
number ofpersons employed, unemployed and
not in the labor force is difficult. Such data do not
enable us to measure directly changes in the pro-
pensity to enter the labor force to search for em-
ployment or changes in the likelihood unem-
ployed persons will withdraw from the labor
force. For example, aggregate statistics showing
an increase in unemploymentdo not indicate
whether the increase is due to increased layoffs,
reduced hiring, increased labor force entry, or
reduced withdrawal from the laborforceby unem-
ployed persons.
It is possible, however, to measure these flows
directly using unpublished data from the monthly
Current Population Survey. Below, an analysis of
these flow data, which provide direct evidence
about the relative importance ofadded-worker
and discouraged-worker effects, is presented. (A
more detailed version appears in the FRBSF 1984
Summer Economic Review)
Labor market flows
Variations in aggregate employment and un-
employmentare determined by labor market
flows intoand outofemployment, unemployment
and out-of-the-labor force. For example, the
change in the numberofunemployed persons in
any given month equals the flow in minusthe flow
out. Thus, given an initial distribution ofthe
population among the three employment status
categories, the number ofpersons in each cate-
gory for all future periods is determined by labor
market flows.
Monthly data from January 1968 through March
1984 reveal that there are large flows into and out
ofthe labor force as well as between employment
and unemployment. In atypicalmonth, for ex-
ample, 1.3 million persons not previously in the
laborforce entered to look for employment while
1.5 million unemployed persons gave up their job
searches and dropped outofthe laborforce. These
are very large flows compared to the 6.4 million
persons who were unemployed in an average
month during this period. Because these monthly
flows between out-of-the-labor-force and un-
employmentare so large, relatively small changes
in th"m can have large effects on the un-
employment rate.
For example, if, as predicted by the added-worker
hypothesis, the flow from out-of-the-labor-force
into unemployment increased during a recession
as newentrants began searching for jobs, the num-
berofunemployed and the unemployment rate
would increase. Or, if, as predicted by the dis-
couraged-worker hypothesis, more job searchers
gave up their job search and dropped out ofthe
laborforce, unemployment would decrease. Thus,
labor market entry and exitdecisions can have
powerful effects on the unemployment rate even
when for labor market participants there have
been nochanges in the difficultyoffindingjobs or
the likelihood oflosing jobs or when there have
been no economy-wide changes in individuals'
employment prospects.
Ifeitherof these views ofthe cyclical variation in
flows between persons not in the labor force and
unemployment were correct, the cyclical variation
in the unemployment rate would not accurately
represent the variation in the demand for labor or
individuals' employmentprospects. Yet, flows be-
tween unemploymentand out-of-the-labor-
force do not directly affectthe numberofem-
ployed persons or the employment rate. Thus, the
employment rate does not suffer from this sort of
potential bias as does the unemployment rate.
The evidence
Analysis ofthe monthlyflowdata shows thataddi-
tional workers doenter the labor force to search
foremploymentduringrecessions butprovides no
indication that job searchers become discouraged.
Chart 1 shows that labor force entry by persons
previously not in the labor force into unemploy-
ment rises substantially during recessions. Such a
cyclical increase is consistent with an influxof
secondary workers caused by the increase in un-
employment among primary earners.
In addition, Chart 1 shows that labor force exit
from unemployment falls during recessions-just
the opposite of what would be expected if job
searchers become more discouraged about their
job prospects during recessions. Such a reduction
in the rate of labor force exit from unemployment
might be due to a larger proportion ofthe unem-
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fits (which subsidize jobsearch) during recessions
than expansions. Whateverthe reason, thecyclical
pattern ofthese two types of Iabor force entry into
and exit from unemployment have strong and di-
rect effects on the unemployment rate-they
cause itto be higherduring recessions than ifthese
flows did not vary overthe cycle.
Although these two flows into and out of unem-
ploymentdirectly affect the numberof unem-
ployed persons and hence the unemployment
rate, they do not directly affect the numberof
employed orthe unemployment rate. This ex-
plains why the unemploymentrate has a much
larger cyclical variation than the employment
rate.
Effect on unemployment
To whatdegree is the unemploymentrate affected
by changes in labor force entry and exitflows?
Comparing the variation in the actual unemploy-
ment rate over several recent business cycles to a
simulated unemployment rate (calculated by
holding labor force entry and exit flows constant
at their mid-cycle levels but with flows within the
labor force taking their actual values) shows that
asubstantial proportion ofthecyclical variation in
the actual unemployment rate is in fact due to
variation in labor force exit and entry flows (Chart
2). Differences in the two rates were especially
prominent in the 1974-75 and 1981-82
recessions.
Ofcourse, labor flows from out ofthe laborforce
directly into employment (without an intervening
unemployment spell) and from employment di-
rectly to out-of-the-Iabor-force also affect the un-
employment rate. They do so because they affect
the number ofemployed persons, which is partof
the denominator in calculating the unemploy-
Shaded areesrepresent racesalona
ment rate. Increased flows into employment from
outofthe labor force reduce the unemployment
rate, and increased flows outofemploymentto
out-of-the-Iabor-force increase it, all other things
equal.
Not surprisingly both ofthese flows also vary over
the business cycle with the demand for labor.
During a recession (when demand is declining),
flows from out ofthe labor force directly into
employment fall. Similarly, flows from employ-
ment to out-of-the-Iabor-force increase. Thus, the
cyclical variation in these two flows also causes
the unemployment rate to be higher during reces-
sions and contributesto thedifference between the
actual and simulated unemployment rates de-
picted in Chart 2.
Conclusions
The cyclical variation in labor force entry and exit
rates causes the unemployment rate to vary much
more overthe business cycle-being higher dur-
ing recessions and lower during expansions-
than it would ifexit and entry were constant.
Conventional wisdom-thatthe rise in unem-
ploymentduring recessions understates thedeteri-
oration in the demand for labor because ofdis-
couraged-worker effects-is inconsistent with the
actual evidence on labor market flows. In particu-
Iar, laborforce entry intounemploymentrises and
labor force withdrawal from unemploymentfalls
during recessions. Because the variation in these
two rates offlow does not directly affect the em-
ployment rate, the employment rate has a much
smaller cyclical variation than the unemployment
rate. Consequently, the cyclical variation in the
employment rate is a superior measure ofthe cy-
clical variation in the demand for labor as well as
individuals' employment prospects.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 182,704 1,067 6,679 5.4
Loans and Leases1 6 163,762 1,200 8,407 7.8
Commercial and Industrial 48,620 231 2,657 8.3
Real estate 60,823 48 1,924 4.7
Loans to Individuals 29,650 114 2,999 16.2
Leases 5,023 - 3 - 40 - 1.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,790 - 111 - 717 - 8.2
Other Securities2 7,152 - 22 - 1,011 17.8
Total Deposits 193,364 5,897 2,367 1.7
Demand Deposits 47,342 4,773 - 1,895 - 5.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,340 712 - 1,991 - 9.1
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,884 868 109 1.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,139 257 4,154 4.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 37,988 268 - 1,599 - 5.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 41,116 - 199 2,951 11.1
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 20,211 - 204 - 2,796 - 17.5
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately